

# **Toward Efficient Fuzzing of Nested Virtualization**

**Reima Ishii** The University of Tokyo ishiir@g.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp

### Takaaki Fukai

National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology takaaki.fukai@aist.go.jp

#### **Takahiro Shinagawa** The University of Tokyo shina@ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp



**Abstract:** 

## Background

- Recent laaS providers support nested virtualization
  - Users run their own L1 hypervisors and L2 guest OSs
- Ensuring security in nested virtualization is crucial

#### Malicious User



### **Previous Hypervisor Fuzzing**

#### Focus Was Not on Nested Virtualization

- Virtual Devices
  - PIO, MMIO, DMA, etc.
- Virtual CPU -
  - Task Switch, APIC Emu, MSR Emu, etc.



**Insufficient Coverage of** 

**Nested Virtualization** 

Even advanced fuzzer like Syzkaller -



#### 3 **Proposal: Specialized Fuzzing for Nested Virtualization**



#### **Challenge 1: Proper Initialization of L2**

Randomly generated instruction sequences struggle to complete initialization

#### **Proposal 1: Small Harness**

- Executes an instruction sequence mutated from a template of correct initialization code

![](_page_0_Figure_30.jpeg)

#### **Challenge 2: Huge VM State Space**

Enormous state space of VMs makes testing all possible

#### **Proposal 2: VM State Validator**

- Randomly generated VM states are rounded to valid states

![](_page_0_Figure_35.jpeg)

- Small Harness: based on VMXbench
- VM State Validator: ported from Bochs' VMCS checker code —
- Fuzzer (Input generation): AFL++, an existing fuzzer -
- Coverage collection: kcov
- Bug detection: KASAN, KCSAN and UBSAN —

**Fuzzing Experiment on KVM** 5

- Focused on Intel VT-x nested virtualization
- Compare code coverage of KVM's nested virtualization

The proposed method achieved 81.3% code coverage in 54 hours

![](_page_0_Figure_47.jpeg)

Discover a new vulnerability (CVE-2023-30456) in KVM -

The University of Tokyo, Shinagawa Laboratory.